

THE NEAR EAST IN 1928

by

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with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

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INTRODUCTION

TEN years after the close of the World War the relative political advancement of the various countries of the Near East offered an interesting study in contrasts. Turkey, which lost more of its territory and prestige during the World War than any other country in the Near East and which in the early post-war months was closer to despair than any of its Near Eastern neighbors, now had achieved a position of political independence which made it pre-eminent among them all. Capitulations, and the extraterritorial privileges which went with them, had long since been abolished; foreigners no longer controlled the country's financial policies; a system of treaties with foreign powers gave Turkish Nationalists a sense of having achieved a new prestige in the eyes of the West, and there was now in progress within the country itself a social transformation which was expected in time to permit Turkey to identify itself completely with the civilized Western world.

In Persia, where westernization was also believed to be an indispensable part of the process of maintaining political independence, experiments in social reform by legislation had begun. The attempt to get rid of unwelcome foreign interests had been less successful here than in Turkey, although the abolition of capitulations in 1928 was a long step toward the realization of Persian ambitions in this respect, since it eliminated certain restrictions on budget-making and on the activity of Persian law courts which had been a source of extreme irritation to the nationalist government.

Egypt, whose economic and political prospects in 1922 had seemed much brighter than those of either Persia or Turkey, failed signally to achieve by 1928 the practical emancipation from outside control which its inhabitants desired. Even with the aid of

Great Britain it proved impossible to abolish capitulations. And even with an overwhelming Nationalist majority in Parliament it proved impossible to persuade Great Britain to withdraw its troops from Egyptian territory. There seemed to have been no progress toward the goal Egyptians had in view. Egyptian politics were likened to a morass. In 1928, for the second time in five years, Parliament was suspended and the Premier and his Cabinet assumed responsibility for the direction of public affairs.

In the mandated territories, too, political advancement varied. Iraq had reached the point of demanding responsibility for its own defense, and was working toward an early application for membership in the League of Nations. Palestine had no such prospects for the immediate future, since it had not yet even acquired a legislature of its own. In Syria a constitution was being evolved; in the Lebanon a constitution had been in effect two years, while in Transjordan the experiment of representative government was yet to be tried.

Independent Arabia, meanwhile, primitive in its social organization, vigorous in its acquisitive tendencies, was harassing the southern borders of British mandated territories. It was evident that even if Iraqis and Palestinians had given up immediate hope of establishing an Arab Confederation, the restless Wahhabis of Central Arabia were not beyond believing in the efficacy of an expansionist policy, and set few limits to their ambitions.

A survey of political developments in the Near East in 1928, then, must be in large part a study of the reaction which association with European powers has produced in the countries lying between the Black Sea,

the Persian Gulf, and the Eastern Mediterranean. A few of the chief developments

of the year in these regions are recorded in the pages that follow.

ARABIA

Arabian affairs, usually passed over almost in silence by the American press, occupied unwonted columns of space in western newspapers during 1928 because of repeated incursions of Arab tribesmen from Nejd into Iraq and Transjordan—territories under British mandate which adjoin Nejd on the north. The repeated raids gave rise at one time to a temporary alarm that Sultan Abdul Aziz Ibn Saoud, ruler of Nejd and the Hedjaz, was about to proclaim a holy war against Iraq and Transjordan, intending to send his Wahhabi (Puritan) tribesmen to overthrow the latitudinarian Shiah and the orthodox Sunnis who were his neighbors. The alarm, featured in the western press, soon proved to have been false, but it served to awaken public interest in Arabian boundary disputes which otherwise might have been accorded scant attention.

The raids of 1928 were not the first which disturbed the mutual relations of Ibn Saoud and the British Government. Raids had been occurring at intervals ever since Great Britain undertook to exercise a mandate on behalf of the League of Nations in Transjordan and Iraq. In fact they had always been one of the features of desert life in this region, as in most parts of Arabia where scanty water-supply discouraged agriculture and permanent settlement.

TREATY PROVISIONS RE BOUNDARIES

But it was only natural that the raids in northern Arabia should arouse more discussion than those occurring in the heart of the country, because the latter usually had only a local significance, while the former have been the source of repeated international complications. The Ojair Protocols to the Treaty of Muhammarah definitely established in May 1922 the boundary separating the dominions of Ibn Saoud from those of his enemy's sons—King Faisal of Iraq and the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan. Since that time it has been less easy for the governments concerned to treat raids in this area indulgently on the ground of their

being a normal and inevitable feature of desert life. They have become instead an object of more or less anxious consideration and of special international agreement.

The first of the Ojair Protocols to the Treaty of Muhammarah, determining the boundary between Iraq and Nejd, contained an article which made the following significant provision:

"Article 2. Whereas many of the wells fall within the Iraq boundaries and the Najd¹ side is deprived of them, the Iraq Government pledges itself not to interfere with those Najd tribes living in the vicinity of the border should it be necessary for them to resort to the neighbouring Iraq wells for water, provided that these wells are nearer to them than those within the Najd boundaries."

This article should be read in conjunction with the one which follows it:

"Article 3. The two Governments mutually agree not to use the watering places and wells situated in the vicinity of the border for any military purpose, such as building forts on them, and not to concentrate troops in their vicinity."²

The articles of a subsequent treaty—the Bahra Agreement of November 1925—made the following additional provisions:


"Article 1. The States of Iraq and Nejd severally recognise that raiding by tribes settled in their territories into the territory of the other State is an aggression which necessitates the severe punishment of the perpetrators by the Government to which they are subject and that the chief of the tribe committing such aggression is to be held responsible.

"Article 2a. A special tribunal shall be set up, by agreement between the two Governments of Iraq and Nejd, which shall meet from time to time to enquire into the particulars of any aggression committed across the frontier between the two States, to assess the damages and losses and to fix the responsibility The decisions of this tribunal shall be final and executory. . . .

"Article 2b. When the tribunal has fixed the responsibility, . . . and issued its decision in that respect, the Government to whom those found guilty are subject shall execute the afore-said decision in accordance with tribal customs, and shall punish the guilty party in accordance with Article 1 of the present Agreement. . . .

1. Alternate form of *Nejd*.

2. Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report on Iraq Administration*. April, 1922-March, 1923, p. 183.



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"Article 6. The forces of Iraq and Nejd may not cross the common frontier in pursuit of offenders except with the consent of both Governments."³

MUTUAL CHARGES OF TREATY VIOLATION

Violations, actual or alleged, of each of the above articles of agreement brought certain issues to a head in 1928, especially as between Nejd and Iraq. The British authorities during 1927 had been carrying out a plan to erect in southern Iraq a series of police posts at various oases for the maintenance of order in the region. Ibn Saoud early protested that this was a violation of Article 2 of the Ojair Protocol and demanded

the demolition of the posts. There was no response to his demand. In November 1927 a raiding party from Nejd under the leadership of a renowned Wahhabi warrior, Faisal ud-Dawish, attacked the Busaiyah police post about seventy miles north of the boundary and killed its occupants. Other raids followed, both on Iraq and on Kuwait—an enclave on the Persian Gulf whose Sheikh was in special treaty relations with Great Britain. The British authorities did not take steps to have the affair brought before a boundary tribunal of the sort provided for in the Iraq-Nejd treaty, but sent out units of the Royal Air Force instead to search for the marauders and to punish them. Air force and ground troops were concentrated at Ur about 100 miles from the Nejd boundary. British armored cars

3. Agreements similar to these between Nejd and Iraq were also made between Nejd and Transjordan. Cf. Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Agreements with the Sultan of Nejd regarding certain questions relating to the Nejd-Transjordan and Nejd-Iraq Frontiers*. (Cmd. 2566.)

and airplanes crossed the boundary; the latter dropped bombs on Nejd territory, inflicting a certain number of casualties.

British authorities defended this violation of Article 6 of the Bahra Agreement by contending that the situation called for immediate action. And because Ibn Saoud, from his capital, Riyadh, almost a two-weeks' journey to the southward, had been either unwilling or unable to undertake the immediate punishment of Faisal ud-Dawish, the British authorities maintained that there was no other effective way to restore order and security in southern Iraq than the one they chose.

Tribesmen of northern Nejd had their own view of the issues involved in the disorders. They complained that raiders came down into their territory from Iraq quite as often as they themselves made raids on Iraq territory. Moreover, it was a notorious fact that when Ibn Saoud had taken steps to punish his own vassals for raids on Iraq, some of them had fled back across the border into Iraq, where they had been welcomed and given a base from which to carry out raids into Nejd territory where they had formerly lived. For this they had not been punished by the Iraq authorities.

The Nejdis were disinclined to accept the British explanation that it was to prevent the latter sort of raid that the police posts were being built in southern Iraq. They still appeared to bear the boundary agreement a grudge for having cut their tribes in two, for having deprived Nejdis of their customary watering places and for having left them insufficient pasturage and drinking water for dry years. The fortifications even of such an oasis as Busaiyah, seventy miles or so north of the boundary, seemed to them a direct infringement of their rights. The raids of November and December 1927 were in part a protest against this alleged infringement of their rights. They were in part, also, a direct retaliation for former Iraqi raids into Nejd territory.

During the first week of March 1928 several Nejd bands raided British mandated territory again, with lateral expeditions into Koweit as well. British marines landed in

Koweit and British airplanes, tanks and armored cars were mobilized along the southern boundary of Iraq and Transjordan. Sensational reports emanating from Basra in Iraq told of how several Nejd tribes had made attacks at widely separated points along their thousand-mile northern boundary. Equally sensational reports were current of the damage inflicted by British bombing airplanes on flocks and herds near Wahhabi encampments, and of the number of casualties the encampments themselves had suffered. But war was not actually declared. Instead, Ibn Saoud succeeded in the end in restraining his vassals and declared that he was desirous of holding a conference with British representatives with a view to clearing up border difficulties.

INEFFECTIVE ATTEMPTS TO TERMINATE RAIDS

For this purpose, Sir Gilbert Clayton, who had acted as British emissary in 1927 during negotiations leading to the Anglo-Hedjaz Agreement of Jiddah, revisited Ibn Saoud in May 1928. Ibn Saoud insisted upon demolition of southern Iraq police posts on the ground that their maintenance violated the Ojair Protocol; he asked that the concentration of troops at Ur be discontinued, and that a stop be put to anti-Nejd propaganda in Iraq, where certain officials were suspected of exploiting the Wahhabi bugbear for no other purpose than to ram conscription down the throats of an unwilling populace. The Iraq authorities, on their side, were willing to recognize the sovereignty of Ibn Saoud over the Kingdom of Hedjaz,⁴ and to restrain former Nejdis now settled in Iraq from carrying out raids into Nejd territory; they were also willing to forego claims for damages to Iraqi life and property growing out of Wahhabi raids; but they refused to demolish their police posts. The Jiddah Conference, suspended for a few weeks in June and July, thus broke down completely in August. Following the Anglo-Iraq refusal to demolish any of the police posts, Wahhabi tribesmen committed further depredations in August. The border remained insecure through the remainder of the year.

4. This sovereignty had already been recognized by Great Britain in the Anglo-Hedjaz Agreement of 1927.

That Ibn Saoud was anxious to maintain a correct attitude toward his northern neighbors was frequently hinted, but his position during the greater part of the year was at best ambiguous. It was not until November that he summoned to his headquarters in Riyadh a great gathering of tribal chieftains¹ to declare that his policy was a peaceful one. His silence up to that time was attributed by some to political pressure at home. As a Wahhabi ruler possessing spiritual as well as temporal power, he was expected to devote himself to the extension of the Puritan faith, whether by missionary effort or by force of arms. But recently he had permitted a lull to supervene in the expansionist movement in which he had achieved such phenomenal success in earlier years. He had not accorded Faisal ud-Dawish the moral and military support to which that zealous Wahhabi leader was deemed by his followers and sympathizers to be entitled. Expressions of dissatisfaction grew more and more frequent. This dissatisfaction, coupled with the ambiguity of his position in the eyes of the British, caused Ibn Saoud to call the Riyadh Conference, during the course of which he asserted the principle that peace should be maintained on the northern boundary. He threatened in the presence of the tribal sheikhs to resign in favor of anyone the conference might designate unless they all subscribed to the principle he had propounded. His *coup de théâtre* was successful. The sheikhs unanimously requested him not to give up his position and undertook to respect his policy. Means for consummating that policy, however, still remained to be determined.

Ibn Saoud's intention to maintain peace on the borders of his dominions seemed to be nowhere clearer than in the case of the southern frontier. Relations between him-

self and the Imam Yahya, ruler of the Yemen, although they were strained throughout 1927, improved during 1928—if only to the extent that rumors of impending conflict grew less frequent. The relaxation of this strain may have been due in part to the fact that the ruler of the Yemen was preoccupied during 1928 with an attempt to gain possession of certain inland towns belonging to the British protectorate of Aden. There was desultory fighting in the interior of Aden, and no very clear indication of whether the British would finally decide to propitiate the Imam or whether, on the contrary, they considered it worth while to preserve the nominal integrity of so loosely organized a hinterland as that which was involved in the dispute. A tendency toward conciliation became apparent in September, about the time that a Soviet trade delegation arrived in the Yemen, but the Imam's troops by this time were already driven out of the town of Dhala which they had occupied in February. British anxiety to prevent the Imam from entering into treaty relations with Soviet Russia bore no fruit, for on November 1 a treaty of friendship and trade was actually signed by Soviet and Yemenite representatives.⁵ This news was all the more unwelcome in London because Great Britain itself had failed in an attempt to negotiate a special treaty with the Yemen in 1926, although the Italians had succeeded where Great Britain had failed. News of the Russo-Yemen treaty, coming as it did hard upon the heels of disorders in Afghanistan which seemed to affect British and Russian interests in a particular sense, did nothing to lessen British suspicion of Soviet designs upon the British Empire. That the Imam's new treaty with Russia was a feather in the Soviet cap no one doubted; but whether it would have any immediate practical effect upon the position of the Yemen was not so clear.

TERRITORY UNDER BRITISH MANDATE

IRAQ

Throughout 1928 the chief anxieties of the Iraq Government concerned Wahhabi raids on the southern border,⁶ the unsatisfactory character of relations between Persia and

Iraq and the difficulty of placing Anglo-Iraq relations on a basis agreeable to both parties. Of these three problems, the last was in many ways the most difficult, since there was bound up with it the whole question of

5. *Soviet Union Review*, March 1929.

6. Cf. p. 64-66.

how Iraq was to achieve in practice the independence which in theory Great Britain had already said it was willing to recognize.

An Anglo-Iraq treaty, signed in London on December 14, 1927 by Jaafar Pasha, then Prime Minister of Iraq, had been an attempt to meet this problem. But the treaty was greeted with no very great enthusiasm in Iraq itself,⁷ and Jaafar Pasha, who had negotiated it, resigned early in January 1928 to make way for a new government under the leadership of Abdul Muhsin Beg as-Saadun. The latter, since he had not been connected in any way with the treaty negotiations, was free to deal with the instrument as circumstances dictated. He approached the task with deliberate caution. Professing a greater interest in the economic development of Iraq than in its immediate political problems, he dissolved Parliament on January 19 and called for new elections, which resulted in a considerable strengthening of his following.⁸ Throughout the election period, while the press carried on a vigorous campaign against the treaty, the Prime Minister maintained a discreet silence on the subject and when Parliament convened on May 19 it learned that he would not submit the treaty for ratification at all during that session. Neither did he do so during the subsequent session, convened on November 2. Negotiations with the British authorities over subsidiary financial and military agreements, which were resumed late in the fall of the year and on the success of which ratification of the new treaty depended, eventually reached an impasse. On January 21, 1929, the Muhsin government resigned, without having succeeded in reaching the desired agreement with Great Britain.

Revision of the financial and military agreements of 1924 turned out to be difficult because of the very decided divergence of views on important points in each. The chief difficulties arising out of the financial agreement concerned ownership of the railways built in Iraq by the British during the war and registration of port lands at Basra.⁹

Considerably more serious than these difficulties, however, was the dispute over revision of the military agreement of 1924. This had provided that the Iraq Government should accept full responsibility for the maintenance of internal order and for the defense of the country by the year 1928 at the latest.¹⁰ The governments of both Jaafar Pasha and Abdul Muhsin Beg wished to introduce conscription in the country as a means of insuring this military self-sufficiency. But the British authorities did not support the conscription scheme; and because it met with active opposition among certain important elements of the Iraq population, the entire year passed without a formal discussion of it in Parliament, although a draft conscription bill was circulated among deputies for their consideration during the autumn recess.

The Muhsin government maintained, in spite of the trouble it was having with Wahhabi raids in the south, that the Iraq forces were now quite sufficient for the defense of the country and that if Great Britain wished to maintain armed forces of its own in Iraq for the protection of British economic and political interests, then the British exchequer should bear the entire cost of maintaining such forces. The British authorities insisted, on the contrary, that Iraq should meet the difference in cost between maintaining British troops in Iraq and maintaining them at home in England—an expense which Abdul Muhsin Beg refused to ask Iraq to bear. And neither the Prime Minister of Iraq nor the British authorities would recede from their respective positions. Whether or not an agreement would be reached when Sir Gilbert Clayton took over the High Commissionership in Iraq it was too soon to say, for although Sir Henry Dobbs resigned in 1928 his successor did not reach Baghdad until March 1929.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH PERSIA

Iraq's disputes with Persia caused a good deal of acrimonious discussion both in Baghdad and in Teheran. Echoes of such discussions were heard also at Geneva, when a

7. Cf. F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. III, No. 26, March 2, 1928.

8. Government supporters, 70; Opposition, 10; Independent, 8.
9. Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Fourteenth Session*, p. 166-167. The Iraq Government was not ready to pay as high a sum for the railways as Great Britain wished to receive. Great Britain objected, moreover, to the registration of port lands at Basra in the name of the Iraq Government until the latter had paid all its debts.

10. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. XXV, p. 104.

Persian delegate introduced the subject while mandates were under consideration at a meeting of the Sixth Committee of the Assembly of the League on September 14 and 15.¹¹ In an exchange of remarks between the Persian and British representatives on the Sixth Committee a number of mutual grievances were aired and almost two months later, when Mr. Bourdillon of the High Commissioner's office in Baghdad presented to the Permanent Mandates Commission the British view of the situation, an even fuller treatment of the subject was given.¹² In these statements the reasons were discussed for Persia's continued refusal to recognize the Government of Iraq. The chief reason given for this was that Persians did not enjoy judicial privileges which Iraq accorded to Americans, Japanese and nationals of certain European powers which had formerly been accorded capitulatory privileges in the Ottoman Empire.¹³

The contention of the Iraq Government was that since the former arrangement between Persia and the Ottoman Empire had been reciprocal, it could not accord special privileges to Persian nationals in Iraq unless Persia would accord similar privileges to Iraqis in Persia. But since Persia had just abolished capitulations, a reciprocal arrangement of the sort was not to be expected.

British and Iraqi opinion opposed the Persian demand for extra-territorial privileges not only because reciprocity in the matter was out of the question but because of a belief that Iraq courts were fully as efficient as those of Persia and because the number of Persian nationals in Iraq was so great that if Persian consular jurisdiction were recognized the judicial system of Iraq would suffer severely.¹⁴

Persians complained of hardships suffered

by their nationals in Iraq, of an alleged intolerance shown by the Iraq population toward Persians, and of heavy taxes which, they said, burdened the poverty-stricken descendants of Persian pilgrims in the Shiah holy cities of Iraq. British authorities discounted these and other charges, giving illustrations which tended to show that Shiah Persians invariably had recourse to Shiah courts, and that the taxes levied on Persians were neither discriminatory nor excessive.

In view of the traditional hostility of Persians and Arabs, adjustment of difficulties outstanding between Persia and Iraq—including questions of customs, consular representation, border incidents and international cooperation—was not expected to be easy.

ANTI-ZIONIST SENTIMENT

That Arabs in Iraq, whether Nationalist or not, were watching the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine with an unfriendly eye was given unfortunate illustration when a hostile mob collected outside of Baghdad to waylay Sir Alfred Mond, a distinguished British Zionist, when he came to that city from Jerusalem on February 10. Sir Alfred Mond avoided difficulty by entering the city from an unexpected direction; leading demonstrators were severely dealt with by the authorities, several students being expelled from the schools in which they were studying. It is interesting to note in this connection that a bill authorizing the flogging of student disturbers of the peace was passed by the Iraq Parliament soon afterward, but the law was subsequently revoked.

ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

Fulfillment of prospects for a considerable economic development in Iraq still waited upon the completion of the country's transportation system. The Iraq Government was approached by a British firm which suggested the construction of a railway line from Baghdad to Haifa. This proposal seemed to offer promise of much more satisfactory returns to Iraq than would the completion of the last link of the former "Baghdad Railway" in the north (Mosul to Nisi-

11. League of Nations, *Journal of the Ninth Ordinary Session of the Assembly*, No. 12, p. 204, and No. 13, p. 217.

12. Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Fourteenth Session*, p. 176.

13. Persian nationals in the Ottoman Empire had enjoyed immunity from search except in cases where Turkish police had previously notified the Persian consul and were accompanied by the dragoman of the Persian consulate. Turkish nationals in Persia enjoyed a similar immunity. Persians wished to benefit by the arrangements made in the Anglo-Iraq Judicial Agreement for the appearance of foreigners in Iraq courts, their choice of judges and the attendance of consuls at hearings when questions of personal status were under consideration. Cf. League of Nations, *Official Journal: Minutes of the Thirtieth Session of the Council*, p. 1345 and 1598; also League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. XXXV, p. 132-4.

14. For a detailed discussion of difficulties arising out of dual nationality of Persians in Iraq, cf. Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Fourteenth Session*, p. 172 and 176 ff.

bin), since the latter line passed through Syria and Turkey, while the former would reach the Mediterranean by a more direct route through British mandated territories. But no contract for a Haifa-Baghdad line was actually granted.

The Turkish Petroleum Company continued during 1928 to find indications of an extraordinary oil supply in the Mosul region, and secured from the government a five-year extension of the period allotted to it for selecting its original holdings, totalling 192 square miles, before other oil companies might enter the field.

On August 4 it was announced that a Near East Development Company had been formed in the United States to act as agent for the participation of five American companies in the work of the Turkish Petroleum Company. This action marked both the termination of a long-standing dispute between European and American members of the Turkish Petroleum Company and heralded the beginning of active participation by American interests in the exploitation of Mosul oil.

Meanwhile a pipe-line survey party worked westward from Baghdad in the spring, reaching the capital of Transjordan in May. But since both Haifa and Beirut were contestants for the pipe-line terminus on the Mediterranean, the survey was not actually completed. Neither was construction begun in the year under review.

TRANSJORDAN

A long-awaited agreement between Great Britain and Transjordan was concluded in Jerusalem on February 20, 1928. It provided for the exercise of legislative and administrative powers in Transjordan by His Highness the Emir through such constitutional government as was to be determined by the Organic Law. British advice, however, was to be followed not only in questions of foreign policy but also in matters of finance, matters affecting the interests of foreigners, control of troops for the defense of the country, the granting of concessions, exploitation of natural resources, the construction and operation of railways and the raising of loans. A British Resident was to represent His Britannic Majesty in Trans-

jordan, since the High Commissioner for Transjordan—on account of his dual office as High Commissioner for both Palestine and Transjordan—regularly resided at Jerusalem. Pending ratification by the British Parliament and by a prospective Constituent Assembly at Amman, this agreement had only a provisional character, but its negotiation constituted none the less an important event in the development of mandatory administration, since it was the second case in which a mandatory power had entered into treaty relationship with a mandated territory as a means of fulfilling its obligations to the League of Nations under Article 22 of the Covenant.

The only other case in which this policy had been adopted was that of Iraq—a much more populous, cultivated and advanced country than Transjordan. Primitive conditions in Transjordan made members of the Permanent Mandates Commission wonder whether it was wise for Great Britain at this stage to transfer to the Emir Abdullah as a “constitutional monarch” the powers of legislation and administration entrusted to the British Government itself by the League of Nations.¹⁵ Although it was the purpose of the Covenant to encourage self-government in the territories under Class A mandate, it was still a fact that Article 1 of the mandate for Palestine and Transjordan had attributed to Great Britain, as mandatory, full powers of legislation and administration. Had Great Britain then the right to delegate these powers to its ward without first consulting the League?

The British Government thought it had, since Article 4 of the new agreement with Transjordan provided that the Emir should adopt all such measures as were required by the terms of the mandate and that he should refrain from adopting any measures which would hinder their fulfillment. The British authorities argued, moreover, that the presence of a British Resident at Amman and of British advisers in the administration generally would guarantee fulfillment of the above stipulation. The provisional agreement with Transjordan, they said, neither invalidated nor replaced

15. League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission. *Minutes of the Thirteenth Session* (June 1928), p. 42 ff.

the mandate. On the contrary it implemented the mandate. And the League had already empowered Great Britain to organize government in Transjordan as it saw fit, providing only that the terms of the mandate, agreed upon in August 1922, were fulfilled.

In this respect, it is interesting to note, the Transjordan treaty differed from the Iraq treaty. The latter made no mention of a mandate; in fact in the case of Iraq there existed no "mandate" in the documentary sense, inasmuch as the draft mandate prepared in 1920 by the British Government had been superseded by the Anglo-Iraq treaty itself, and inasmuch as the League Council had accepted this treaty as giving effect directly in itself to the provisions of Article 22 of the League Covenant.

The experiment in Transjordan of permitting a treaty to co-exist with the specific terms of a mandate was thus a new departure in the administration of a mandated territory.

Nationalists in Transjordan and beyond denounced the Emir Abdullah for his acquiescence in the February agreement, believing that he had lost an excellent opportunity to win something more for Transjordan than the mere shadow of responsible government. It was true that in the preamble to the new agreement there was a statement to the effect that Great Britain was prepared to recognize the existence of an independent government in Transjordan under the rule of the Emir.¹⁶ It was true, also, that in this respect the Transjordan agreement went further than the original Iraq treaty, which made no mention of independence and only a passing reference to Iraq's national sovereignty. But the Nationalists anticipated no very early translation of this theoretical principle of independence into terms of actual administrative practice in Transjordan, professing to see in the new agreement only a move to expedite the realization of British ambitions in this region, whatever those ambitions might be. These views they placed formally before Sir John Chancellor, the new High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, when he visited Amman in December, but without any immediate practical result.

PALESTINE

A new milestone was reached in 1928 by those whose immediate business it was to promote the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Up to this time the responsibility for Jewish settlement in Palestine had been borne by the World Zionist Organization; but five years of negotiation with leaders of non-Zionist Jews now resulted in the actual adoption of a policy which made collaboration between Zionists and non-Zionists possible. The way for this agreement had been prepared in January 1927, when a Joint Palestine Survey Commission was arranged for by leading Zionist and non-Zionist Jews—a commission which was to make a thorough investigation of past colonization activities in Palestine with a view to determining the effectiveness of the policies hitherto followed by the Zionist Organization. This commission, composed of four prominent Zionists and non-Zionists,¹⁷ visited Palestine in 1928, and, after studying a series of comprehensive technical reports prepared by neutral experts, met in London in June to draw up a statement outlining the policies which they believed the reorganized Jewish Agency ought to follow if the collaborating Zionists and non-Zionists were to achieve the success for which they hoped. The resolutions formulated by the Joint Palestine Survey Commission were endorsed in principle by the World Zionist Congress in Berlin in July 1928 and accepted subsequently by non-Zionists at a meeting in New York in October.¹⁸ The general executive of the World Zionist Organization decided in December that the way was now clear for actual reorganization of the Jewish Agency in 1929 on lines which would permit all Jewry to participate in the establishment of the National Home in Palestine.

More than one group of Zionists feared that the inclusion of non-Zionists in the Jewish Agency on the proposed basis was dangerous. Some of these pointed to the skepticism with which the Joint Palestine Survey Commission seemed to regard some

17. Mr. Felix Warburg and Dr. Lee K. Frankel of the United States; Sir Alfred Mond (Lord Melchett) of England; Dr. Oscar Wassermann of Germany. For abstract of recommendations of this commission cf. Appendix, p. 82.

18. For considerations which led to cooperation with the Zionist organization of representative Jewish groups hitherto not included in the Zionist movement, cf. *Proceedings of the Non-Zionist Conference concerning Palestine held at the Hotel Biltmore, N. Y., October 20 and 21, 1928.*

16. For text of the agreement, cf. *Near East and India*, April 5, 1928, p. 427.

of the sentimental and philanthropic aspects of past settlement activity in Palestine, and prophesied that if the reorganized Jewish Agency was going to insist only upon the "sound economic principles" of which the commission made so much it might do incalculable injury to the Zionist ideal itself. Jewish labor groups, meanwhile, resented the report of the commission because it condemned experiments in communal settlement and recommended that hereafter experiments of this sort should be abandoned and individual initiative and sound cooperative institutions be encouraged instead.

Arabs in Palestine, who formed over three-fourths of the population, had not yet become complacent concerning the establishment of a Jewish National Home in their midst. Some of them had begun to feel, however, that a policy of political non-cooperation was not the most effective way of opposing it, as they had been inclined to believe a few years before when they had rejected an opportunity to join with Palestinian Jews in electing a representative government. An All-Palestine Arab Congress in June 1928 cabled a demand for self-governing institutions to the British Colonial Secretary and to the League of Nations. This congress could no longer claim to speak for the entire Arab population of the country, for some had begun to regard the policies of the congress as extreme. But there were many Arabs even outside the congress who objected to taxation without representation and to the existing system of government by administrative ordinance.¹⁹ Accordingly Arab groups made representations to the retiring High Commissioner, Lord Plumer, before he left Palestine the end of July after a three-year tenure of office, and to his successor, Sir John Chancellor, upon his arrival in Jerusalem. The latter gave his petitioners no immediate hope of securing parliamentary government, however, replying that he would take up the matter with the Secretary of State for the Colonies when he next visited London in the summer of 1929.

19. Draft ordinances were published in the *Official Gazette* and often revised by the High Commission on the basis of protests or suggestions of responsible Palestinians before their actual coming into effect. Some draft ordinances were withdrawn entirely if opposition to them was strong enough—on the analogy of the relinquishment in 1928 of a plan to impose duties on merchandise entering the country from Syria—a plan which was strongly opposed by Palestinian merchants.

WAILING WALL INCIDENTS

Latent animosity between Arab and Jewish elements of the population came to a head in September and October over incidents which occurred in Jerusalem at one of the Holy Places which has frequently been the scene of similar clashes in the past—namely, the Wailing Wall, sacred to Jews because it is the only part of the ancient Temple still remaining and to Moslems because the Mosque of Omar is built above it. The first of this year's incidents occurred during the Jewish services on the Day of Atonement, when police forcibly removed a partition dividing men from women worshippers.²⁰ The interruption occurred at the most solemn moment of the service and caused general confusion and hot indignation. A month later it was the turn of the Jews to protest against the erection by Moslems of a small building on top of the Wailing Wall. A few Moslems attacked a group of Jews at the Wailing Wall about the same time and two Arabs were imprisoned as a result.

These incidents aroused Jews and Moslems both in Palestine and outside to a high pitch of excitement. Delegations called upon Mr. H. C. Luke, the Acting High Commissioner, with protests and conflicting demands. Both parties claimed that their rights with respect to the Holy Places had been violated. There were public demonstrations, and numerous appeals to the League of Nations and the British Government. Article 14 of the Mandate for Palestine provided that a special commission should be appointed by the mandatory to study, define and determine rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places,²¹ but in view of the extreme delicacy of the question and the state of opinion in the country the mandatory authorities had not yet been able to appoint such a commission, and even at the end of 1928 there seemed

20. The principle had already been established that Jews should not attach furniture to the pavement before the Wailing Wall lest this should lead in time to new claims of Jewish property rights in the area. Moslems of the vicinity were vigilant and complained to the authorities whenever they observed any innovations at the Wailing Wall which might conceivably be construed as an attempt to establish new property rights. British authorities ordered the removal of the screen to prevent an outbreak on the part of Moslem extremists.

21. League of Nations, *Official Journal*, August 1922 (Part II), p. 1009.

no prospect of immediate appeasement of rival ambitions.

The economic condition of Palestine was the object of at least as much anxious attention, however, as racial and political conflicts. The depression of 1926 and 1927 had begun to lift, but there was still much distress, and scanty rains only added to the difficulties of agriculturists. The financial policy of the Palestine administration came in for criticism on several points, all of which cannot be referred to here. Dissatisfied persons pointed out that only 2.67 per cent of the entire budget was set aside for the direct encouragement of agriculture, which, as the basic industry of Palestine, deserved, in their opinion, a greater share of the annual appropriation. With a surplus of £P1,500,000 (almost \$7,500,000) remaining from former years, something more might be done, they suggested, to hasten the return of prosperity in agriculture. The railroads, for example, which were built originally to serve strategic purposes, were so located that they failed to pass through some of the richest agricultural regions in Palestine. A railway deviation project sponsored by the High Commission, was intended to remedy this situation in part; but the scheme had to be abandoned (temporarily at least) for lack of funds. About the same time the Palestine administration paid into the British Treasury £P210,800 (over \$1,000,000) in consideration of a deficit car-

ried over from the days of the military administration before the Palestinian mandate was established. Palestinians maintained that the British Government might at least have postponed its demand for reimbursement until after the railway deviation project had been carried out and other necessary measures taken for the restoration of prosperity in Palestine.

The administration was generally commended, however, for two fiscal reforms whose effect became apparent in 1928: (a) a tariff reform exempting raw materials from duty and protecting Palestinian manufactures from outside competition, and (b) the revaluation of urban property and scrapping of an outworn Turkish system of taxation of urban properties. Revenues in 1928 were at once larger than in 1927 and more equitably distributed. But on account of heavy extraordinary expenditures amounting to £P820,164 (about \$4,000,000),²² there was a budgetary deficit of £P711,265 (about \$3,500,000) for the first ten months of the calendar year.

Only preliminary work was yet being done on the Dead Sea concession, the Rutenberg electrical concession and the Haifa harbor project, but there was general hope that unemployment would be relieved as soon as construction work was at its height, and that the end of extreme economic depression was in sight.

TERRITORY UNDER FRENCH MANDATE

In the Republic of Greater Lebanon, the Jebel Druze and the State of West Syria—three of the four States into which the French authorities have divided the Class A mandate entrusted to their administrative control—affairs moved along without spectacular incident during 1928, although in Greater Lebanon experiments were tried in altering the size of the Cabinet and in handling the local sectarian problem which deserve fuller treatment than can be given within the limits of the present review.

Syria, the largest of the four small States in French mandated territory, spent the year in constitutional struggles. It had emerged from a two-year rebellion in 1927; in 1928, because of the alteration of French policy which the rebellion induced, Syrians

were able for the first time to apply themselves to the practical task of setting up a representative government of the sort they had been demanding ever since French troops drove the Arab government of the Emir Faisal out of Damascus in 1920 and replaced it with an administration of the French authorities' own making.

The present High Commissioner, M. Henri Ponsot, prepared the way for the first really general election in Syria with his customary thoroughness, and succeeded in winning at least the temporary confidence and cooperation of the Nationalists. His success stood in marked contrast to the failure of his predecessor, Senator de Jouvenel, whose impetuous decision to hold elections in January

22. Including the \$1,000,000 referred to above.

1926—while rebellion was still in progress and while martial law was still in force in Damascus—had resulted in disturbances and deportations and only haphazard voting in the few districts where a Nationalist boycott did not affect the entire population.

High Commissioner Ponsot did not permit elections to be held until April 1928, after martial law had been abolished and amnesty extended to all but about fifty of the Nationalist leaders. He proclaimed a new electoral law and entrusted the actual carrying out of the elections to a new government under a Damascene notable, Sheikh Taj ed-Din. The latter, although not a thorough-going Nationalist, was a person believed to be less obnoxious to the majority of Nationalists than the former Prime Minister, Damad Ahmad Namy Bey, who was generally suspected of too great dependence upon the French, primarily because he had consented to accept office at their suggestion at a time when the Nationalists were in open rebellion.

CONTROVERSY OVER DRAFT CONSTITUTION

The Constituent Assembly elected in April 1928 was made up of seventy deputies, some twenty of whom were extreme Nationalists—men of influence who could be counted on to sway almost all of the remaining fifty deputies to vote in favor of any policy they adopted. The assembly was convened on June 9. It appointed a committee, under the chairmanship of Ibrahim Hanano (an amnestied rebel leader from Aleppo), to draw up a constitution for Syria. By the end of July a draft was ready.

But early in August, a week after the draft constitution was published, the High Commissioner announced that he would have to reserve six of the proposed articles because they conflicted with the international commitments of France, being contrary to the spirit and letter of the mandate. The articles to which he took exception were as follows:²³

1. Article 2, providing that the Syrian territories detached from the Ottoman Empire should constitute an indivisible political unit and that the divisions which had been created therein

since the Great War were not to be taken into account.²⁴

2. Article 73, giving the President of the new Syrian Republic power to grant individual pardons and to the legislature the power of granting general amnesty.

3. Article 74, giving the President treaty-making power and providing that none of the more important classes of treaty should become effective until ratified by the Assembly.

4. Article 75, giving the President power to name the Prime Minister and to appoint diplomatic representatives to foreign countries and receive foreign diplomats accredited to Syria.

5. Article 110, giving the legislature power to enact a law organizing a Syrian national army.

6. Article 112, giving the President power to declare martial law, subject to ratification by the legislature.

The Constituent Assembly, maintaining that these articles were necessary to the welfare of the country, refused to accept the High Commissioner's reservations. So, to avoid deadlock and to permit friendly negotiations on the disputed articles, M. Ponsot suspended the sittings of the Constituent Assembly until November 11. The scene of discussion shifted at the end of August to Paris, whither M. Ponsot and several Nationalist leaders repaired to consult the French Government itself and to continue their conversations. Here no agreement was reached, however, and the reopening of the Constituent Assembly was postponed for another three months, or until February 11, 1929. M. Ponsot returned to Syria in December. Meanwhile the attitude of the Permanent Mandates Commission, made clear at its thirteenth session in Geneva (June 1928), encouraged the French authorities in their refusal to accept the draft constitution as it stood. The commission had warned the French authorities that although it expected them to educate Syria for self-government as rapidly as possible, it also expected them to retain a great enough degree of authority so that they would be fully able to direct and superintend Syria's evolution—a *sine qua non* in the fulfillment of their obligations toward

23. Cf. *Le Temps*, October 22, 1928, p. 1, and *The Syrian World* (New York), September, 1928, p. 46.

24. This might be interpreted as a claim of sovereignty over the Jebel Druze, the Alaouite State and certain territories lying half-way between Damascus and Beirut now under the jurisdiction of the Lebanese Republic; or, more broadly, it might even be interpreted to include Transjordan itself where, curiously enough, an agitation for unification with Syria began to be apparent about the time the Constituent Assembly in Damascus began its work.

the League of Nations. It was asserted during the discussions of the commission that the French authorities must maintain the right to intervene in Syrian affairs whenever their responsibility for the good administration of the country necessitated such intervention. They must not sign away to their ward all power of control over the government until Syria was truly able to govern itself.²⁵

No solution of the constitutional dispute was arrived at before the conclusion of the year. French Socialists on November 30 demanded in the Chamber of Deputies that Syria be granted full self-government and that France withdraw from the country as a measure of economy; but the motion was defeated by 380 votes to 200, the Premier having asserted that if France withdrew, another more imperialist country might assume control in Syria—a country which might not fulfill its duties as a mandatory power with the same “magnificent disinterestedness” as France.

Meanwhile a monarchist movement was developing within Syria. This won support, however, only from the personal followers of the various aspirants to the hypothetical Syrian throne. Public security was better assured than at any time since the outbreak of rebellion, although banditry was reported again in the Damascus district in the latter

part of the year, and although a few unpleasant attacks occurred on the persons of individuals who happened to be involved in political controversy.

In its foreign relations Syria had no special difficulties except in one instance. The delimitation of the Turco-Syrian boundary had been interrupted in 1927 by a dispute concerning the disposition of certain territories on the extreme northeastern frontier of Syria, into which a large number of Turkish Kurds were said to have moved recently. The dispute remained unsettled throughout 1928. Members of the boundary commission, in conformity with the terms of the Franco-Turkish treaty of May 1926, submitted their dispute to a Danish arbitrator, General Ernst. The Turks failed, however, to recognize the validity of General Ernst's decision, which favored the French contention; and many of the inhabitants of the disputed territory evacuated it in anticipation of further difficulties in the region, which had been under actual occupation by Turkish troops for some time.²⁶

As in Palestine, insufficient spring rains in Syria resulted in unsatisfactory summer crops and considerable distress among the poor during the fall and winter. Economic conditions in general were, nevertheless, somewhat better in the mandated territory than they had been during the disturbed years immediately preceding.

TURKEY

A spectacular development in the westernization process in Turkey occurred in 1928 when the Angora Government decided to scrap the Arabic alphabet, in use ever since the conquest of Asia Minor by the Turks, and to adopt the Latin alphabet in its stead. The change was spectacular chiefly because of the rapidity and thoroughness with which it was introduced. It was first endorsed by the President in July 1928. By the end of October, after two months' notice, all government employees were compelled to use Latin characters exclusively. By December 1 newspapers were no longer permitted to appear in Arabic type. The President of the republic by precept and example encouraged all citizens to support the

change and to instruct the ignorant. A literacy campaign was inaugurated. All adults under sixty-five years of age who were unable to read or write were required to attend night schools until they were able to pass literacy tests. A strictly phonetic system, it was perhaps easier for young children to learn than the adapted Arabic characters formerly in use; but to adults it offered a number of difficulties. This fact did not deter the authorities, however, from undertaking to reduce illiteracy in Turkey from 80 or 90 per cent to 10 or 20 per cent in the course of a few months.

Another important item in the westernization process attracted much less attention

25. League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Thirteenth Session*, p. 183, 217.

26. League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Thirteenth Session*, p. 175-6. Also *Bulletin of International News*, November 24, 1928.

than the substitution of Latin for Arabic characters. This was the amendment of the Constitution, by a unanimous assembly vote, so as to complete the separation of Church and State in Turkey. From Article 2 was deleted the assertion that the religion of the Turkish State is Islam, and in Article 16 the form of oath to be administered to deputies in the assembly was altered to read "I swear on my honor" instead of "I swear before God. . . ."

Jews, upon whose freedom of movement restrictions had been placed in 1927 after a clash between certain Jews and Moslems in Constantinople, were now given permission to travel once more. But Armenian and Greek Christians were still denied similar privileges. Restrictions which prevented Christians from travelling in the interior were retained for political reasons, however, and not because of religious discrimination. It was the policy of Angora not to permit the infiltration into Anatolia of racial minorities which might serve as nuclei of disaffection in the future.

The religious propaganda law, meanwhile, remained in full effect. An interesting case involving the interpretation of this law was brought into the Turkish courts when three American teachers in a mission school at Broussa were charged with converting minors from Islam to Christianity. The fact that the young converts in question entered into religious discussions voluntarily and outside of school hours was not held to absolve the teachers from blame under the existing law. Two appeals to higher courts brought no reversal of the original verdict. The school remained closed and nominal sentences were imposed on the teachers.

A new departure of the government was the publication in October 1928 for the first time of a volume containing all official statistics available concerning Turkey. It was announced that similar reports would be published annually.

Ratification of the Ottoman public debt settlement by the Grand National Assembly late in the year necessitated increased appropriations for foreign payments in the 1928-29 budget. The additional burden was dreaded by citizens upon whom the weight of taxation already pressed heavily. They

were accordingly pleased to discover when the budget was published that appropriations for national defense were being reduced while appropriations for public works had been raised. The government still wrestled, however, with very difficult economic problems. Plans were made for the creation of a State bank and a return to the gold standard, but neither of these objects was actually accomplished in 1928. There were difficulties, too, about concluding an agreement with a new company, in connection with the railroad contract which had first been granted to a Belgian concern and then cancelled. Negotiations were entered into with an American firm, Fox Brothers International Corporation, for construction of this line and one other (totalling 750 miles in length) and of two modern harbors, one on the Mediterranean at Mersine and the other on the Black Sea at Samsun. The only actual contract signed by this corporation before the close of the year, however, related to the construction of car and locomotive works, station buildings, a bridge and a water-pipe line. Meanwhile, Swedish and German firms proceeded with the construction of other railway lines intended to open up the interior of Anatolia to a brisker trade.

RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN POWERS

Turkey continued during 1928 to seek the friendship of foreign powers (particularly of western powers) and to extend its system of treaties. For the first time it sent its Foreign Minister, Tewfik Rushdi Bey, to a general international conference at Geneva when it was invited, at the suggestion of Russia, to participate in the work of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission in April.

At the close of the conference Tewfik Rushdi Bey engaged in conversations with the Greek Foreign Minister concerning naval disarmament in the Aegean and the Sea of Marmora. For a time it appeared to be not unlikely that improved relations between Greece and Turkey would make an accord possible before the close of the year. But the perennial dispute over details of the work of the Mixed Commission on the Ex-

change of Populations²⁷ brought friendly negotiations to a standstill at the end of November and Premier Venizelos, who had planned to visit Angora in December, cancelled his trip.

Negotiations with Italy fared better. The way was prepared for a treaty by the conversations which Tewfik Rushdi Bey had with M. Mussolini on his way home from Geneva, and on May 30 a neutrality, arbitration and conciliation pact was actually signed.²⁸ The pact was the first agreement of the sort which Turkey had concluded up to this time with an ex-enemy power. It marked the passing of a fear of Italian aggression upon the Turkish mainland—a fear which had long troubled the Angora authorities and the Turkish inhabitants of the western and southern coasts. Friendly messages, sent by M. Mussolini to Mustapha Kemal Pasha on the occasion of the unveiling of the latter's statue in Constantinople and after the visit to Turkey of 1,000 young Fascisti, served to increase the feeling of mutual cordiality. So, too, did the announcement in October that Italy had decided to return to Turkey more than 100 pieces of classic statuary excavated in the province of Adalia during the Italian occupation in 1919. Italy undertook, moreover, to act as mediator between Greece and Turkey, and when M. Grandi, Italian Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Angora in December it was understood that he did so with a view to bringing the two countries closer to an accord.

Other treaty negotiations entered into by Turkey during 1928 included:

- (a) Negotiations with Bulgaria for a treaty of non-aggression.
- (b) Negotiations with Hungary for a treaty of neutrality and arbitration.
- (c) Negotiations with the United States for treaties of arbitration and conciliation.

The only eastern power with which Turkey actually concluded a treaty during the course of the year 1928 was Afghanistan. Already bound to each other by a treaty of perpetual friendship, the two countries renewed their expressions of mutual regard in a ten-year treaty of friendship, mutual support and non-aggression, signed at Angora on May 25 during the visit of King Amanullah.²⁹ The treaty provided, among other things, for the dispatch of Turkish military, judicial and scientific experts to Afghanistan.

With Russia Turkey's relations continued to be cordial, in spite of the existence in Turkey of Soviet propaganda for which the authorities were always on the alert. Several arrests brought the propaganda question to the fore from time to time. The closing of *Arcos*, a Russian trading company in Constantinople, was generally presumed to have been due to pressure from Angora and to be a result of alleged propagandist activities.

Troubles on the Syrian frontier³⁰ and difficulties with Greece were thus the two chief exceptions to a general statement that Turkey's relations with foreign countries were continuing to improve steadily.

PERSIA

In Persia the determination of Reza Shah to build up a new national independence and a new economic strength for his country expressed itself during 1928 both in a relentless pressure upon ultra-conservative elements within the country and in a successful demand for non-interference of foreign powers in certain phases of Persian public life.

Emulating in some respects the westernization policy of Mustapha Kemal Pasha in Turkey, Reza Shah courted the displeasure of the powerful Shiah clergy by extending facilities for female education and by publishing decrees permitting women to appear unveiled, even in public places—such as theatres and restaurants—from which they had formerly been debarred. Further decrees, supported subsequently by Parlia-

27. For illustrations of the difficulties encountered by this commission, cf. Permanent Court of International Justice, *Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement of December 1st, 1926*. (Series B, No. 16, August 28, 1928).

28. This was subsequently ratified by the Grand National Assembly in September 1928.

29. *European Economic and Political Survey*, May 15-31, 1928, p. 590. Also *The Near East and India*, June 7, 1928, p. 713.

30. Cf. p. 75.

mentary action in the last week of the year, forced all Persian men outside the ranks of the clergy to wear European clothing, with military caps substituted for hats.

As a modest provision against the permanent economic exploitation of Persia by foreign interests, 100 Persian students were sent by the government to study in European engineering schools and colleges, while foreign technical advisers were employed in Persia itself to establish various industrial enterprises destined eventually to become thoroughly Persian—such as a cement factory, a paper factory, ironworks and other similar plants. Still more important was the establishment of six provincial normal schools, one of their special features being the facilities they were to offer for the study of physics and chemistry.

To a country as deeply devoted to tradition as Persia, these innovations, both individually and in their cumulative effect, constituted a shock strong enough to elicit violent response. There were repeated outbreaks. In April the mountaineers of Luristan killed the Minister of Public Works while on a tour of inspection. In October Arab tribesmen in southwestern Persia near Ahwaz killed six officials who were disarming the inhabitants and forcing them to adopt European clothing. In the Tabriz region in northern Persia there was also open disaffection. Persian troops were brought into each of these areas to restore order. But the most serious uprising of the year occurred in December in the southeast, where a powerful leader, Dost Mohammed, raised the standard of revolt and terrorized the countryside, poisoning wells and defying the authority of the Shah generally.

Persia, which has not been on the main highways of world travel since the Cape route to India began to be used, has had much less contact with the outside world than Turkey in modern times. A much smaller proportion of its women are educated than is the case in Turkey; the hold of the clergy upon the people is stronger; and there is no national railway system. These and other elements in the Persian situation made it considerably more difficult and more dangerous for Reza Shah to introduce reforms by administrative decree and

legislation than it was for Mustapha Kemal Pasha to do so in Turkey.

The Persian Government continued to encourage improvement of facilities for transportation and communication in Persia. Commercial flying was considerably extended, especially in the north. In the first six months of 1928 mail planes of the Junkers Company (German) covered more than 44,500 miles over Persian territory—a distance equal to 90 per cent of the flying mileage for the entire preceding year. Motor transportation also increased. It was railway construction, however, which commanded chief attention. Begun under government auspices in 1927, the building of a 1,000-mile trans-Persian railway from Khur Musa (now Bander Shahpur) on the Persian Gulf to Bander Gaz (now Bander Shah) on the Caspian Sea was entrusted in April 1928 to a syndicate of American, French and German firms. Their contract called also for the construction of a combined railway bridge and irrigation dam at Ahwaz in one of the cotton areas and for the development of port facilities at either terminus of the line. Work proceeded in both north and south simultaneously. In mid-December the first shipload of rails arrived at Bander Gaz for the German section of the road in the north. The work of construction was expected to continue for at least five years before the road could be completed.

ABROGATION OF CAPITULATIONS

An even more emphatic illustration of Reza Shah's determination to raise Persian national life to a new level was the successful abrogation on May 10, 1928 of the capitulations, whereby for precisely 100 years Persia had granted extraterritorial privileges to westerners within its boundaries. The restrictions placed upon Persian law courts and upon Persian tariff autonomy by the treaty powers had proved especially galling to the new Shah because they were at once a badge of inferiority and a permit for foreign interference in Persian fiscal policies. Since 1921 when Russia voluntarily renounced the special rights given it by the Russo-Persian treaty of 1828, there had been more eagerness than ever in the Persian capital to throw off the unpopular

treaty restrictions. But Turkey proved to be the only treaty power which followed Russia's example voluntarily. The remaining treaty powers, such as France, the United States, Great Britain and Germany, waited until the Shah's government denounced the capitulations before they entered into new treaties with Persia on a basis which did not provide extraterritorial privileges for their nationals.

There had been some anxiety in Persia as to whether Great Britain would acquiesce in the unilateral abrogation of the capitulations by the Persian Government. The latter took the precaution, accordingly, to withhold permission from the Imperial Airways, Ltd. to route its Cairo-to-Karachi air service across Persian territory as originally planned. When it became clear that the British Government would relinquish the extraterritorial rights of its nationals in Persia the Teheran authorities agreed in principle to permit British planes to fly over Persian territory, although certain other of

its misunderstandings with Great Britain had not yet been cleared up. In December 1928, a law was promulgated at Teheran specifying the conditions under which foreign airplanes might use airdromes in the three chief Persian cities on the Persian Gulf.

With tariff autonomy thus assured, the Persian Government set to work to evolve a new financial policy with the assistance of the German and Swiss experts engaged to replace Dr. A. C. Millspaugh and the American Financial Mission, several members of which withdrew from Persia in 1927.

An event which gratified Persians considerably was the election of their country to one of the three non-permanent seats on the Council of the League of Nations which became vacant in 1928. When the Persian representative was welcomed to the Council in September the chairman pointed out that this was the first time a Moslem State had enjoyed such an honor.

EGYPT

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

In January 1928 Egyptians were preoccupied with curious speculation as to what was contained in the draft treaty negotiated in London during the latter half of 1927 by Premier Sarwat Pasha and Sir Austen Chamberlain.³¹ It was not until February 27 that Sarwat Pasha presented the draft to his Cabinet. Up to that time secrecy was observed as to its terms, while Sarwat Pasha attempted to secure from Sir Austen Chamberlain written assurances as to the interpretation that would be placed by the British Government upon certain clauses of the proposed treaty.

Sarwat Pasha proved to be right in his contention that, without the assurances for which he asked, the Wafd, or Nationalist party, would refuse to consider the draft treaty at all.

The instrument was designed "to give precision to the relationship between the two countries by resolving and defining the outstanding questions at issue which formed

the subject of the [British] reservations . . . of the 28th February, 1922."³² Article 1 of the draft treaty provided for an alliance between the two countries. Article 2 bound Egypt not to conclude with a foreign power any agreement prejudicial to British interests. Article 3 bound Great Britain (subject to provisions of the League Covenant) to come to Egypt's aid in the capacity of belligerent if Egypt ever became involved in a defensive war with a foreign power. Conversely, Article 6 provided that if Great Britain were menaced with or engaged in war it should be furnished in Egyptian territory with all the facilities and assistance the King of Egypt could provide, including the use of ports, airdromes and all means of communication, even though the war in question should in no way affect the rights and interests of Egypt itself.

In Article 9 Great Britain undertook to use all its influence to obtain a modification

31. For text of the draft treaty cf. *The Near East and India*, March 15, 1928, p. 333.

32. The British declaration of this date recognized the independence of Egypt subject to four reservations. The British Government retained responsibility for: (a) The security of imperial communications in Egypt. (b) The defense of Egypt against foreign aggression or interference. (c) The protection of foreign interests and of minorities. (d) The Sudan.

of the capitulatory régime in Egypt,³³ and in Article 10 to support Egypt's request for admission to the League of Nations. Article 11, moreover, provided for the substitution of an Ambassador for the British High Commissioner hitherto resident in Cairo. The British Ambassador, like the High Commissioner, however, was to be granted precedence over all other foreign representatives. Further articles in the draft treaty provided that the Egyptian army should be trained according to British methods; that in engaging the services of foreign officials the Egyptian Government should as a rule give preference to British subjects, and that the Egyptian Government should consult the British Government as soon as any circumstance arose which seemed likely to involve difficulties with a foreign power or to threaten the lives or property of foreigners residing in Egypt. Any disagreement as to the application or interpretation of the treaty which could not be settled by direct negotiation was to be dealt with according to the provisions of the League Covenant.

Egyptian Ministers made objection to several of these articles but to none so much as Article 7, which authorized the maintenance upon Egyptian soil of such British forces as the British Government considered necessary for protecting the lines of imperial communication, pending conclusion at some future date of an agreement whereby the Egyptian Government would assume the task. Although it was stated that the presence of these forces should not constitute in any manner a British occupation, Egyptians did not wish to agree to the arrangement because such action, they maintained, would give legal sanction to a situation they wished to terminate and might make it more difficult eventually to have the British forces removed from Egypt. A provision that the question should be reconsidered ten years after the treaty went into effect (and the aid of the Council of the League invoked if no direct agreement could be reached) did not seem to them to offer sufficient guarantee of the fulfillment of Egyptian desires.

EGYPT REJECTS THE TREATY

The Cabinet refused to entertain the treaty at all, despite Sarwat Pasha's view that it ought not to be flatly rejected. Accordingly on March 4 the Premier delivered a note to Lord Lloyd, the British High Commissioner, declaring that since the basic principles and actual provisions of the draft treaty made that instrument incompatible with the independence and sovereignty of Egypt and since it legalized occupation of the country by British forces, the Cabinet could not accept it. On the same day the Sarwat government resigned.³⁴

The British Government responded in a note on March 7 that it could not permit the discharge of any of its duties under the declaration of February 28, 1922 to be endangered by Egyptian legislation or administrative action. It therefore reserved the right to take such steps as future situations might demand. The note contained a warning against the passage of certain bills then under consideration by the Egyptian Parliament which, if adopted, would place restrictions on the power of the police to break up public gatherings,³⁵ relax restrictions on the carrying of weapons and of poisons, and weaken the powers of the provincial authorities while increasing those of political organizations.

There were student demonstrations and disorders here and there after the British note was received, but no loss of life. Nahas Pasha assumed the reins of government, assisted by a coalition Cabinet of Wafdists (Nationalists) and Liberals. It was this government which on March 30 addressed a new note to the British Government in reply to the communication of March 4. It characterized the latter as "a perpetual interference with the internal conduct of Egyptian affairs, paralyzing the exercise by Parliament of its right to legislate and control administration and rendering impossible the existence of a Government worthy of the name." The principle of such an intervention the Egyptian Government was not prepared to admit. It was quite willing, however, to assume responsibility for pro-

33. Foreign powers were invited on December 25, 1927 to attend a conference in Cairo in February 1928 for the purpose of agreeing on a new judicial régime in Egypt. But they rejected Egypt's proposals for capitulatory reform and there was no change in the *status quo* during 1928.

34. Sarwat Pasha himself died of heart failure in Paris six months later (September 22, 1928).

35. This bill was later to gain prominence as the public assemblies bill.

tection of the lives and property of foreigners and for the defense of the Suez Canal by Egyptian troops alone, except when British troops were expressly invited to assist them.

On April 4, after four days of suspense in Egypt, the British reply to this note was published. The Egyptian note, it stated, could not be accepted as a correct exposition of Anglo-Egyptian relations. Certain reservations had been made in the declaration of February 28, 1922, which the recently negotiated treaty would have superseded; but since the draft treaty had been rejected the reservations continued to be operative. The Wafd had feared a stronger reply than this. Its members expressed relief.

The divergence of views between the British and Egyptian Governments had a practical consequence at the end of April, however, when a British ultimatum suddenly arrived giving the Nahas government forty-eight hours in which to withdraw a public assemblies bill which was considered prejudicial to the interests of foreigners, inasmuch as it removed certain existing checks upon public meetings—checks which had a practical value in times of excitement. The Egyptian Government was requested to give assurance in writing that the bill in question would not be proceeded with. Otherwise the British Government would take appropriate action. British warships were ordered to Egyptian waters.

The Egyptian Government did not give the assurance demanded. It replied instead that inasmuch as the public assemblies bill had already passed the Chamber of Deputies it would be unconstitutional to withdraw it at this juncture. The government had recommended to the Senate, however, that the latter body should postpone consideration of the bill until the fall session.

There was some doubt in Egypt as to whether Nahas Pasha's note would satisfy Great Britain. Relief was general when it was learned that the British order to the warships had been countermanded and that a British communication had arrived stating simply that if the controversy over the public assemblies bill were to be revived by

Egypt the British Government would be obliged to intervene once more.

PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT SUSPENDED

But circumstances were to prevent the issue from being raised again in November when the fall session was scheduled to open. The Nahas government fell during the third week of June. There had been dissension in the Cabinet for some time and eventually a few of its members resigned, about the time when charges were laid against the Premier and the president of the Chamber that they had accepted sums of money in consideration of a promise to influence legislation in such a way as to aid a litigant in a private lawsuit involving a large fortune. After these defections from the Cabinet the King called on Nahas Pasha to resign on the ground that his Cabinet no longer represented a true coalition as it was originally intended to do. Nahas Pasha, however, with the full support of the Wafd, took the unusual course of refusing to resign, intending to fill Cabinet vacancies by appointments from the Wafd party alone. The King immediately issued a royal rescript dismissing Nahas Pasha and his Cabinet and by June 27 a new Ministry was completed, led by Mohammed Pasha Mahmud, vice-president of the Liberal party, who had been the first Minister to desert Nahas Pasha's Cabinet a short while before.

Mohammed Pasha Mahmud adopted drastic means to put an end to the political excitements of recent years. Parliament was first adjourned for a month by royal rescript on June 28 and then suspended for a minimum period of three years by another decree on July 19. Mohammed Pasha Mahmud and his Cabinet assumed full legislative authority. They announced that they would devote their attention to economic reform and promotion of administrative efficiency. Troops were sent to a few provincial centers to assist the police in maintaining order, and the powers of provincial governors were extended.

As was to be expected, the Wafd protested against this suspension of constitutional government. There were press attacks on the Cabinet, and in November a meeting of 135 Wafdist deputies and sixty-

three Senators declared it would hold the existing government responsible for all expenditures in excess of appropriations legally voted by Parliament. There was less dis-

order in the country than had been anticipated, however, and in many parts of the country a welcome respite from political controversy.

APPENDIX

Brief Résumé of Conclusions and Recommendations of the Joint Palestine Survey Commission.

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

A broad survey of Jewish activities in Palestine since the close of the World War leads to the general conclusion that the results may be regarded as hopeful for the future, though mistakes have been committed in the course of these years.

II. IMMIGRATION

Subsections 1-2. Jewish interests will be best subserved by maintaining a reasonable balance between the number of immigrants admitted and the economic needs of the country. The Jewish Agency should propose changes in immigration schedules three times instead of twice a year.

Subsections 3-7. More thorough selection of individual immigrants; encouragement of qualified immigrants possessing independent means; repayments of advances to immigrants to be enforced as soon as possible; dissociation of immigration policies from local politics.

III. AGRICULTURE

Subsections 1-6. Approximately 8 per cent of cultivable land now in Jewish hands. No new colonies to be established until funds are in hand for consolidating existing colonies. Criticism of government for not expediting settlement on certain lands. Suggestion that government speed up afforestation work, alter existing system of taxation, and exempt new agricultural enterprises from taxation for a five-year period.

Subsections 8-16. Land should be prepared for settlers so that they can make a living from the beginning. Jewish Agriculture Colonisation Department should be administered according to sound economic principles. Further establishment of communal settlements undesirable. Recently founded communal settlements to be converted into individualistic cooperative settlements or training centers. Establishment of hill colonies to be abandoned. Land purchase to be encouraged by settlers. Hydrographic survey and experiments in fertilization to eliminate temptation to excessively close settlement in the future. Formal written contracts between settlers and Jewish Agency to be based on economic value of land, and prompt payment insisted upon. Outside hired labor ought to be permitted, a minimum wage being assured to such laborers.

Subsections 17-22. Unscientific use of water for irrigation purposes to be prevented, crop specialization encouraged, and cooperative marketing and buying established on a non-doctrinaire basis. Extension of agricultural research, in relation to marketing as well as to production.

IV. INDUSTRY

Subsections 1-10. Encouragement of commerce and tourist trade. Adequate hotel facilities. Judicious protection of promising local industries. Customs agreements with neighboring countries. Reduction of freight rates on goods for export. A Tariff Board and a Transport Board to be created. Home industries as well as factories to be encouraged. Coordinated effort between Jewish Agency and government for establishing bureau to give advice respecting transfer of existing manufacturing plants to Palestine.

V. EDUCATION

Subsections 1-2. Government grants to non-government schools should be based on the proportion of children attending them. Present system of allowing Jewish Agency to distribute grants satisfactory.

VI. PUBLIC HEALTH

Subsections 1-5. Government should assume a larger share of responsibility in relation to public health. Jewish medical and health work to be coordinated and consolidated.

VII. LABOR

Subsections 1-4. Principle should be recognized that industry and agriculture must be established on an economic basis, providing equitable return on capital invested if there is to be a progressive increase in standards of living. Conciliation machinery to be established to reduce industrial disputes. Sound cooperative organization to be encouraged.

VIII. FINANCE

Subsections 1-2. During transition period the position of existing Zionist funds should be strengthened.

CONCLUSION

Minimum budget of £1,000,000 (\$5,000,000) a year should be aimed at. Commissioners appeal to

the entire Jewish world to make the necessary sacrifices to establish an ideal which will prove a just source of pride and satisfaction to all members

of the community, and will be regarded by the world a worthy effort on behalf of Jewry for the re-establishment of the country of their origin.

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